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SCIENTIFICALLY COMPLEX CASES, TRIAL BY JURY,
AND THE EROSION OF
ADVERSARIAL PROCESSES
Joseph Sanders*
INTRODUCTION
On the day I was asked to participate in the Clifford Symposium on
Tort Law and Social Policy I also checked out of the library Mirjan
Damaska's book, Evidence Law Adrift. It was a very fortuitous coin-
cidence, for his book has much to offer those interested in the state of
the civil jury in America today.1
Damaska begins his book by discussing some unique aspects of the
American law of evidence, including its technical character,2 and its
complex web of exclusionary rules, especially those "intrinsic exclu-
sionary rules" that reject probative information on the belief that its
exclusion will enhance fact-finding accuracy.3 He notes that histori-
cally two reasons have been offered up for the unusual aspects of the
American law of evidence. The first, advanced by James Thayer,
along with many others, is that the common law's fact-finding arrange-
ments are "the child of the jury system."'4 A second and more recent
* A.A. White Professor of Law, University of Houston; J.D., Ph.D., Northwestern Univer-
sity. This paper was enriched substantially by a dinner conversation I had with Robert Kagan,
Richard Lempert, Ron Pipkin, and Marie Province at the Law and Society Association Annual
Meeting in Aspen last June. I thank them all.
1. MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT (1997) [hereinafter DAMASKA, EVIDENCE
LAW ADRIFT]. I had been planning to read the book for quite some time, not only because it
concerned a topic about which I am interested, but also because I believed that professor
Damaska's earlier book on comparative legal systems, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE Au-
THORITY, is the best single discussion of the topic since Max Weber. MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE
FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY (1986). In that book, as in EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT,
Professor Damaska brings a rich and nuanced understanding of continental legal systems to his
analysis of our own. He allows us to gain sufficient intellectual distance so that we can see the
whole forest and not just the individual trees that comprise American trial practice.
2. Damaska notes that the technical character of evidence rules in the United States is re-
flected in the fact that "there is relatively little an untutored person can extrapolate from his or
her ordinary life experience that can be used in forensic proof-taking without much lawyerly
intermediation." DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT, supra note 1, at 11-12.
3. Id. at 14.
4. Id.
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theory is that they are the child of the adversary system. 5 It seems to
Damaska and to me that one does not have to choose between these
two explanations, for fact-finding arrangements are indeed influenced
by both. The jury, the adversary system, and the law of evidence are
closely bound together. What happens to one inevitably affects the
other two. One cannot have a useful discussion of the civil jury with-
out placing it in this larger context.
Evidence law, civil juries, and adversarial processes are themselves
buffeted by changes in the American legal landscape. In the jargon of
science, they are dependent variables, affected by factors such as in-
creasing docket pressures and the mounting costs associated with jury
trials. 6 Near the end of his book, Damaska points to two other related
factors that promise to force additional changes on the American civil
justice system: the growing complexity of fact finding7 and "the creep-
ing scientization of factual inquiry. '' 8 Indeed so. Increasing complex-
ity and the scientization of civil cases are two of the most important
and profound changes in civil litigation in the last two or three
decades.
In this essay I wish to focus on the impact of these developments on
evidence law, juries, and adversarial processes. That is, I wish to treat
the increasing complexity and the growth of scientific testimony as the
independent variables and examine their effects on the law of evi-
dence, the role of juries, and adversary processes. As Damaska's
book makes clear, however, these three "dependent" variables are
themselves interwoven in a complex relationship. Pressures placed on
one inevitably affect the other two. 9
The primary thesis of this paper is that the growth of the use of
science in court and the accompanying increase in fact finding com-
plexity have placed pressures on the ability of the civil jury, embedded
in an adversarial set of procedures, to correctly resolve disputes.
These pressures are nowhere greater than in the trial of complex
(often mass) torts that involve the use of scientific experts. For a
while it appeared that the legal system might respond to the pressure
5. Id. at 2.
6. Damaska's basic argument is that these factors have lead to the erosion of adversarial
processes and the marginalization of juries, and this in turn has weakened traditional justifica-
tions for unique aspects of American evidentiary rules. Id. at 142.
7. Id. at 140.
8. Id. at 143,
9. See Stephan Landsman, Of Witches, Madmen, and Products Liability: An Historical Survey
of the Use of Expert Testimony, 13 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 131, 138-50 (1995).
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created by these kinds of cases by restricting trial by jury.10 However,
it now appears that something quite different, although equally
profound, is occurring. Rather than a substantial diminution of the
role of juries in civil cases, the law has altered the evidentiary and
procedural rules that surround trials. Specifically, it has altered the
evidentiary rules of admissibility, and less obviously, it has taken steps
to erode the adversarial nature of trials. More specifically, it has
taken steps to weaken party control over litigation by empowering
judges and juries to play a more active role in the trial process.
Section I briefly reviews the growth of scientifically complex cases
in civil litigation." Section II discusses the problems jurors have in
dealing with the expert evidence presented in such cases.' 2 Section
II113 discusses the emergence of a new standard for the admissibility
of scientific evidence as embodied in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.'4 I argue that the evidentiary changes embodied
in this and subsequent opinions can be understood as an attempt to
assist jurors with expert evidence by reducing party control over ex-
pert testimony. Section IV expands upon this argument by discussing
other procedural changes designed to facilitate the jury's task.' 5
Taken as a whole, the common theme of these changes is a reduction
in the adversarial nature of complex trials. The conclusion summa-
rizes the paper and offers some thoughts about the future of civil jury
trials.16
I. THE GROWTH OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
It is commonplace that expert testimony plays an important role in
civil litigation, especially in tort litigation.' 7 Recently, its ubiquity has
been documented in several studies. For example, a study of 529 civil
jury trials in California between 1985 and 1986 revealed that experts
testified in 86% of the cases and that an average of 3.8 experts testi-
10. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1084 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding
that due process considerations may cause there to be a complex case exception to the right to
trial by jury). But see In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 431 (9th Cir. 1979)
(holding that there is no complexity exception).
11. See infra Part I.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part III.
14. 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part V.
17. Indeed, civil jury trials are very much a tort law phenomenon. For example, in over 70%
of all civil trials to a jury in California in the mid-1980s and early 1990s concerned personal
injury claims. Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System
Geared To Settlement, 44 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 6 (1996).
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fled in each case. 18 Experts appeared in 100% of the products liability
cases.19 The majority of personal injury cases involved a "battle of the
experts," with expert witnesses testifying for both the plaintiff and the
defendant. 20
The widespread use of experts is beyond conjecture. What is less
clear is the rate of growth of expert testimony. Michael Green reports
that between 1974 and 1989 the number of regularly testifying experts
in Cook County (Chicago), Illinois increased 1,540%.21 More re-
cently, Samuel Gross and Kent Syverud report growth in the number
of experts in California civil jury trials between 1986 and 1991. The
mean number of experts rose from 3.3 per case in 1985-86 to 4.1 in
1990-91, nearly a 25% increase over this five-year span.22 These data
suggest substantial growth, but we lack comprehensive, systematic
data.23 What is certain is that there is no foreseeable diminution in
the use of experts, and that they have now become a mainstay in civil
jury trials. To the extent that expert opinions are difficult to compre-
hend and assess, the prevalence of this type of evidence poses a seri-
ous problem for civil trial by jury.
This leads to the central question concerning experts: Is their in-
creased prevalence accompanied by increased difficulty? If the
number of experts were increasing but their testimony was on balance
easier to comprehend and assess, then this growth would not pose a
great comprehension problem for civil juries.24 Is expert testimony
increasingly more difficult? On this question the picture is even
murkier. Arguing against increased difficulty is the fact that the ma-
jority of experts in court are medical doctors, a traditional area of ex-
pertise. 25 On the other hand, it may be that even within categories of
18. Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 1113, 1120.
19. Id.
20. Id.; see Daniel W. Shuman et al., An Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses
in the Courts-Part 11: A Three City Study, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 193, 196 (1994).
21. Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Liti-
gation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 643, 669 n.123
(1992).
22. Gross & Syverud, supra note 17, at 31-32.
23. Other indirect indicators also suggest a growth in the use of experts in recent years. For
example, a number of firms, such as Technical Advisory Service For Attorneys (TASA), are now
in the business of providing experts to lawyers for a fee.
24. The growth might pose other problems if it led to longer trials.
25. Gross & Syverud, supra note 17, at 31-32 n.46 (finding that nearly 60% of all experts in
California civil cases in 1985-86 were medical experts, and almost all of them were medical doc-
tors). The next largest category is industrial and mechanical experts, and engineers, presumably
testifying mostly in product liability cases. Id. at 32. Only 3% of the experts were identified as
"scientists." Id. Based on a review of a group of North Carolina cases, Neil Vidmar argues that
many malpractice cases do not involve complex scientific questions. Neil Vidmar, Are Juries
[Vol. 48:355
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experts the comprehensibility of testimony has changed. There is a
substantial difference between the difficulty of assessing the testimony
of a treating physician testifying that a fall on a slippery floor is what
caused the plaintiff to break her arm, and a treating physician testify-
ing that exposure to a pesticide is what caused the plaintiff's memory
lOSS. 26
Given the limited evidence now available, one cannot conclude with
certainty that the "mean difficulty" of expert testimony in civil cases
has gone up. What is more certain is that the absolute number of
"hard" cases has increased. Moreover, many of these cases have two
other attributes that have magnified their significance. First, many
have involved mass torts, and therefore represent a large number of
other similar cases, the value of which will be altered by each verdict
rendered. 27 Second, and not unrelated, many of the cases have been
tried in federal courts, primarily due to removal under diversity juris-
diction. This forum has given the cases a higher profile than they
otherwise might have enjoyed.
In sum, although it seems likely that we are experiencing an overall
growth in both the volume and complexity of scientific evidence, there
is in fact little systematic evidence on point one way or the other.
What is clearer is that at the top there are a greater number of highly
visible cases involving complex scientific questions, many involving
mass torts such as asbestos exposure and silicone implants. This in
turn has generated considerable interest in the question of whether
jurors are competent fact-finders when presented with such cases.2 8
II. JUROR COMPETENCE
Current judicial interest in the competence of jurors in complex
cases can be traced to complex antitrust litigation in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. In In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litiga-
tion,29 the Third Circuit indicated that due process considerations may
cause there to be a complex case exception to the right to trial by
jury.30 This opinion followed academic discussions concerning
Competent to Decide Liability in Tort Cases Involving Scientific/Medical Issues? Some Data
From Medical Malpractice, 43 EMORY L.J. 885, 899 (1994).
26. See Kannankeril v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 128 F.3d 802 (3d Cir. 1997).
27. See Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass
Torts, 43 HASTINGs L.J. 301 (1992).
28. For this discussion, I set aside criminal cases that present difficult scientific questions. It is
the case, however, that trials such as that of O.J. Simpson cast further doubt on the jury's capac-
ity to understand complex scientific evidence presented in an adversarial context.
29. 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
30. Id. at 1084.
19981
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whether the Seventh Amendment protected a right to jury trial in
such cases. 31 Despite substantial literature discussing this issue, the
empirical evidence on point is somewhat limited. Here is most of
what we know on the topic.
Joe Cecil and his colleagues reviewed a number of studies of juror
competence in complex cases.32 A Federal Judicial Center study of
lengthy civil trials indicates that jurors in such cases found the evi-
dence to be more difficult than did jurors in shorter cases where the
evidence was less demanding. 33 Nevertheless, a majority of both
groups of jurors believed that they were able to comprehend the
evidence.34
Neil Vidmar reviews several studies assessing the degree to which
jury verdicts agree with those of experts independently assessing the
evidence in malpractice cases. 35 One of the more complete studies,
conducted by Mark Taragin and his colleagues, 36 compared jury ver-
dicts on liability against the judgment of negligence made by the insur-
ance company's physician .evaluator.37 The correlation between the
verdicts of the evaluators and juries was statistically significant. Plain-
tiffs won 21% of the cases the evaluators rated as "defensible" (i.e. the
defendant's behavior was not negligent), 30% of the unclear cases,
and 42% of the "indefensible" cases.38 In a more recent study, Bryan
Liang gave eleven anesthesiologists in a primary teaching hospital of
Harvard Medical School the facts of twelve malpractice cases involv-
ing an anesthesiologist defendant. 39 In two separate surveys they
were asked to assess whether the defendant failed to exercise due
care, and these results were compared to actual jury verdicts in the
twelve cases. Combining all cases, physician agreement with jury ver-
dicts on the first survey was 58% and on the second survey was 56%.40
The results of these studies are, of course, open to various interpreta-
31. For a review of this debate, see Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult
Issues: Lessons from Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 733-34 (1991) and Richard 0.
Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Let's Not Rush to Judgment, 80 MICH. L. REV. 68
(1981).
32. Cecil et al., supra note 31, at 750-63.
33. JOE S. CECIL ET AL., JURY SERVICE IN LENGTHY CIVIL TRIALS 38 (1987).
34. Id.
35. Vidmar, supra note 25, at 903-06.
36. Mark I. Taragin et al., The Influence of Standard of Care and Severity of Injury on the
Resolution of Medical Malpractice Claims, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 780 (1992).
37. These judgments were non-discoverable and therefore presumably represented the physi-
cians' true best estimate of the value of the case. Id. at 781.
38. Id.
39. Bryan A. Liang, Assessing Medical Malpractice Jury Verdicts: A Case Study of an Anesthe-
siology Department, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 121, 125-26 (1997).
40. Id. at 129.
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tions. They indicate that jury verdicts are not random events with re-
spect to the quality of the evidence, but they also suggest that many
errors are made. What we do not know is exactly how to assess this
result.41 We do not know, for example, whether jurors did better or
worse on "hard" cases, or whether another fact-finder (a trial judge or
even another insurance company evaluator) would do better than the
jury.
One of the most ambitious investigations of jury decision-making in
complex cases is a report by a special committee formed by the Amer-
ican Bar Association ("ABA") section on litigation. 42 Researchers
studied four complex cases in the areas of sexual harassment, anti-
trust, insurance fraud, and misappropriation of trade secrets.4 3 The
researchers collected data on jury performance by interviewing the
judge and attorneys after the trial and the jurors after their delibera-
tion.44 They also arranged to have alternative jurors sit through the
trial.45 The alternates were videotaped as they deliberated and at-
tempted to reach a verdict.4 6 The Committee concluded that jurors do
have significant difficulty with large volumes of data, especially when
the evidence is not about a topic with which the jurors are already
familiar.47 In one six-week trade secret case jurors reported they "felt
overwhelmed by the technical nature of the evidence.... In post-trial
interviews, some jurors could recall nothing about the voir dire, open-
ing statements, or the antitrust aspects of the case. .... "48 The sheer
length of trials affected performance, both through exhaustion and
through boredom.4 9 Organization also impaired jury comprehen-
sion.50 Jurors dislike sidebar conferences and the other mundane in-
terruptions that are a normal part of the trial of these cases.51 A
discouraging note is that in three of the four cases the alternative ju-
rors deliberated to a different verdict from the real jurors.52 While the
Committee explains this is in part due to the fact that there were
fewer jurors in the alternative jury deliberations, this lack of consis-
tency is troubling given that all jurors heard the same case.
41. Id.
42. SPECIAL COMM. A.B.A SEC. LrITo., JURY COMPREHENSION IN COMPLEX CASES (1989).
43. Id. at 8.
44. Id. at 5.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 25.
48. SPECIAL COMM., supra note 42, at 25-26.
49. Id. at 31-32.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 33.
52. Id. at 59.
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One of the studies reviewed by Cecil and his colleagues was con-
ducted by Molly Selvin and Larry Picus. 53 They interviewed jurors in
an asbestos case involving four plaintiffs exposed to varying amounts
of the mineral and who suffered varying degrees of illness.54 They
found that the jurors misunderstood the development of asbestosis in
that they tended to believe that the disease was progressive and fatal,
and that, therefore, all four plaintiffs would eventually be as ill as the
sickest plaintiff.55
In a very useful article, Richard Lempert reviewed the ABA and
Selvin and Picus studies along with several other reports of jury per-
formance in complex cases.56 He employed a three point "defensibil-
ity scale" (high, moderate, low) to rate each verdict both on the merits
and on the damage award in cases where the plaintiff prevailed.5 7 In
the thirteen cases he examined, the defensibility of the decision on the
merits was rated as high in seven cases, moderate in four cases, and
low in two cases. 58 The ratings with respect to damages were less
favorable: three of the seven juries which were rated high on the mer-
its were rated low on damages. 59 He also rated the cases in terms of
his own sense of the inherent difficulty of the evidence, again on a
three point scale: high, moderate, and low. 60 Of the six cases scored as
low on inherent difficulty, four juries reached highly defensible ver-
dicts and two reached moderately defensible verdicts.61 Of the seven
trials rated moderate or high on difficulty, three juries reached highly
defensible verdicts, two reached moderately defensible verdicts and
two scored low on defensibility.62 The one jury for whom the evi-
dence difficulty was rated high, but whose verdict on the merits was
rated as highly defensible, found damage amounts that Lempert rated
low on defensibility.63 Overall, one can conclude from this study that
jury performance is more likely to be a problem in those cases that are
"complex" because of the technical nature of the evidence.64 This
53. MOLLY SELVIN & LARRY Picus, THE DEBATE OVER JURY PERFORMANCE: OBSERVA-
TiONs FROM A RECENT ASBESTOS CASE 10-11 (1987).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 24-25.
56. Richard 0. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve Years, in
VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 181 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 185-88.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Lempert, supra note 56, at 185-88.
63. Id.
64. Furthermore, Steven Friedland describes complex cases in which juries experienced com-
prehension problems. Steven I. Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in De-
[Vol. 48:355
COMPLEX CASES
conforms to the observation by Cecil and his colleagues that the most
difficult type of evidence for jurors is that containing statistical and
technical information. 65
Generally, studies that have asked jurors specific questions about
the actual evidence in their case have uncovered greater comprehen-
sion problems than studies that only ask the jurors whether they un-
derstood the expert evidence. Such research includes the ABA and
Selvin and Picus studies. Similarly, Steven Friedland describes several
complex cases in which juries experienced comprehension problems. 66
Joseph Sanders interviewed jurors about the testimony of specific wit-
nesses in a complex evidence case involving the drug Bendectin. 67 He
concludes that the jurors had a weak grasp of the science and that
their verdict was indefensible. 68
Relatively little experimental work has been done on jury compre-
hension of complex evidence. 69 One recent laboratory study by Joel
Cooper, Elizabeth Bennett, and Holly Sukel examines the effect of
complexity on the way mock jurors process information.70 The social
psychology literature suggests that there are two processes that lead to
persuasion.71 In systematic or central processing, people examine the
content of a communication to assess its validity. Persuasion is pri-
marily a function of the quality of the arguments presented.72 On the
other hand, in peripheral or heuristic processing people do not attend
to the quality and validity of arguments.73 Rather, they adopt short-
cuts to determine the value of a message. 74 People rely on factors
ciding Cases, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 190, 197-98 (1990). Sanders interviewed jurors in a complex
evidence case involving the drug Bendectin. He concluded that the jurors had a weak grasp of
the science and that their verdict was indefensible. Joseph Sanders, Jury Deliberation in a Com-
plex Case: Havner v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 16 JUST. Sys. J. 45 (1993).
65. Cecil et al., supra note 31, at 757-58; see, e.g., Reid Hastie & Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can't
Do Well: The Jury's Performance as a Risk Manager, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 849 (1998). William C.
Thompson & Edward Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The
Prosecutor's Fallacy and the Defense Attorney's Fallacy, 11 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 167 (1987);
William C. Thompson, Are Juries Competent to Evaluate Statistical Evidence?, LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 9; Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Em-
pirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 849 (1998).
66. Friedland, supra note 64, at 190-91, 197-98.
67. Sanders, supra note 64, at 61.
68. Id.
69. See Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its Meaning
and Its Effects, 18 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 30-31 (1994).
70. Joel Cooper et al., Complex Scientific Testimony: How Do Jurors Make Decisions?, 20
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 379 (1996).
71. Id. at 381.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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such as the number of arguments (rather than their quality), the at-
tractiveness of the communicator, and the communicator's creden-
tials.75 Peripheral processing is more likely to occur when there is a
lack of motivation to attend to an argument or the ability to process a
message is not present.76
Cooper, Bennett, and Sukel test the proposition that the difficulty
jurors have in processing complex testimony causes them to engage in
peripheral processing.77 That is, the difficulty causes them to addend
to peripheral cues such as the expert's credentials rather than engage
in central processing. 78 Mock jurors watched a videotaped trial in
which experts presented evidence on whether polychlorinated biphe-
nyls ("PCBs") caused the plaintiff's cancer. 79 The experiment
manipulated the credentials of the plaintiff's scientific expert and also
manipulated the complexity of his evidence.80 Consistent with the re-
searchers' hypothesis, among jurors who heard the high complexity
version of the trial, those who received the testimony from a highly
credentialed individual were more likely to vote for the plaintiff than
those who heard it from the less credentialed expert.81 On the other
hand, among jurors who heard the low complexity version, the cre-
dentials of the expert did not predict verdicts.8 2 The researchers inter-
pret this result as evidence that low complexity jurors tended to
decide based on central processing, while the high complexity jurors
employed peripheral processing.8 3
The fact that the expert's credentials act as a surrogate for the qual-
ity of the expert's argument might cause some to conclude that jurors
generally are awed by experts. This, however, does not appear to be
the case. The ABA study finds, for example, that the jurors in their
four cases were not overly impressed with the experts, and dismissed
many of them as "hired guns."'8 4 In fact, the Committee concludes
75. Id.
76. Cooper et al., supra note 70, at 381.
77. Id. at 381-82.
78. Id. at 382.
79. Id. at 384. This and similar questions have been litigated with some frequency. See, e.g.,
In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 113 F.3d 444 (3d Cir. 1997).
80. The experiment employed what is called a 2 x 2 factorial design. Cooper et al., supra note
70, at 383-86. That is, there were four versions of the experiment (high complexity, high creden-
tials; high complexity, low credentials; low complexity, high credentials; low complexity, low
credentials). Each "juror" viewed one of these four versions embedded in a one-hour long
videotape of a trial. Id.
81. Id. at 387.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 390.
84. SPECIAL COMM., supra note 42, at 40. This finding agrees with other research on the im-
pact of experts. See the studies summarized in Neil Vidmar, Assessing the Impact of Statistical
[Vol. 48:355
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that a witness who is perceived to be a hired gun can do positive harm
to a party's case.85
Selvin and Picus report a general skepticism if not a negative dispo-
sition toward the experts in the asbestos case. 86 Apparently a fre-
quent jury response to difficult scientific issues is to downplay the
importance of the experts and their testimony.87 Perhaps the clearest
statement of this view is found in one juror's comment in an asbestos
case studied by Jane Goodman, Edith Green, and Elizabeth Loftus:
"[T]he expert testimony was not a real factor in our decision, except in
the very backhanded sense that it lent medical credence to any re-
sult."88 Such reports suggest that central processing is hampered not
only by the complexity of the evidence, but by the lack of motivation
of some jurors to fully attend to the testimony of party experts.89
In sum, the interview and experimental data tend to indicate that
jurors do have trouble with complex scientific expert testimony. Were
no other factors involved, these results would support calls for restrict-
ing trial by jury in complex cases. However, many, indeed most re-
searchers, who have studied jury behavior in complex cases argue that
the task is made more difficult by the limits placed on jurors by Amer-
ican adversarial legal processes. For example, Cecil and his colleagues
note that jurors often operate under less than optimal circumstances:
"Many of the difficulties encountered by jurors in civil trials may orig-
inate from confusing presentation of factual and legal issues and other
needless impediments to their fact-finding task." 90 They discuss re-
forms such as bifurcation of trials, jury note-taking, pre-instructions
and written instructions, and the use of court-appointed experts.91 A
review of the cases studied by Lempert indicates that difficulties en-
Evidence, A Social Science Perspective, in THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS
AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS 279, 297 (Stephen E. Feinberg ed., 1989). The perception that
jurors are overwhelmed by experts simply because they are experts is not true.
85. SPECIAL COMM., supra note 42, at 40.
86. SELVIN & Picus, supra note 53, at 27.
87. For example, Diamond and Casper, reporting on a laboratory study of jury decision mak-
ing in a complex antitrust case, noted that, "[L]ack of clarity, that is, perceived complexity and
difficulty, discourages the jurors from accepting an expert's position, rather than inducing them
to accept it." Shari S. Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Conse-
quences: Damages, Experts and the Civil Jury, 26 L. & Soc'Y REV. 513, 543 (1992); see Michael
J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics,
15 L. & Soc'Y REV. 123, 145 (1980-81) (describing errors in judgment resulting from faulty
heuristics people tend to use in order to integrate complex information).
88. Jane Goodman et al., What Confuses Jurors in Complex Cases, TRIAL MAG., Nov. 1985, at
68.
89. Id.
90. Cecil et al., supra note 31, at 765.
91. Id. at 766-71.
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countered by jurors were enhanced, if not caused by lawyers and
judges.92 These voices are joined by many others proposing various
ways to improve jury performance through a larger gatekeeper role
for judges in keeping invalid science from juries,93 greater use of
court-appointed experts,94 and other devices to provide the court with
non-party expert opinions,95 special scientific training for judges,96
greater judicial control over the admissibility of expert testimony,97
aids to jury comprehension such as jury note taking and jury ques-
tions,98 improved jury instructions,99 pre-deliberation jury discus-
sions, 100 and the use of bifurcated trials designed to cause the jury to
focus its attention on the difficult causal questions presented in com-
plex cases.101 Even those who conclude that juries are generally doing
92. Lempert, supra note 56.
93. David Faigman, Mapping the Labyrinth of Scientific Evidence, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 555, 556
(1995) [hereinafter Faigman, Mapping the Labyrinth]; David Faigman, Struggling to Stop the
Flood of Unreliable Expert Testimony, 76 MINN. L. REV. 877, 879 (1992) [hereinafter Faigman,
Struggling to Stop]; Leslie A. Lunney, Protecting Juries from Themselves: Restricting the Admis-
sion of Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Cases, 48 SMU L. REV. 103 (1994).
94. See Nancy J. Brekke et al., Of Juries and Court-Appointed Experts, 15 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 451, 453 (1991) (reporting on an experiment on the effect of court appointed experts on
jury decision making); Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert's Invitation: Defin-
ing a Rule for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995
(1994); E. Donald Elliot, Toward Incentive-Based Procedure: Three Approaches for Regulating
Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U. L. REV. 487 (1989) (discussing court appointed experts); Gross,
supra note 18, at 1220.
95. See Lawrence S. Pinsky, The Use of Scientific Peer Review and Colloquia to Assist Judges
in the Admissibility Gatekeeping Mandated by Daubert, 34 Hous. L. REV. 527 (1997).
96. See Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J.
1535 (1998).
97. See Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for
Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715 (1994); Faigman, Mapping the Labyrinth, supra note
93.
98. See Steven D. Penrod & Larry Heuer, Tweaking Commonsense: Assessing Aids to Jury
Decision Making, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 259 (1997).
Reviewing the empirical research on the effect of jury note-taking and questions on the
quality of jury decision making, the authors concluded, "With the exception of the find-
ing that juror questions promote juror understanding and alleviate their doubts about
the trial evidence, our findings offer little affirmative support for the purported advan-
tages of note-taking and questions." However, the findings are also overwhelmingly
unsupportive of the purported harmful consequences. In short, our findings suggest
that the effects of these procedures are really rather innocuous.
Id. at 280.
99. See Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us About the Jury
Instruction Process, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 589 (1997) (reviewing the social science re-
search relevant to evaluating the effectiveness of judicial instructions).
100. See Natasha K. Lakamp, Comment, Deliberating Juror Predeliberation Discussions:
Should California Follow the Arizona Model?, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 845 (1998).
101. See Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, An Experimental Investigation of Proce-
dural Issues in Complex Tort Trials, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269 (1990) (presenting research on
the effect of bifurcation for jury outcomes); Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testi-
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a good job seem to conclude that their performance might be im-
proved by some of these changes. As Vidmar notes with respect to his
study of jury performance in malpractice cases, "Nothing in the data
argues against experimenting with procedural modifications such as
bifurcated trials, special verdicts, neutral experts, or special masters to
assist the jury. '10 2
Academic suggestions as to how to improve legal process often fall
on deaf ears when presented to judges and practicing lawyers. In this
case, however, the legal system has in fact moved in the directions
suggested by academics. The next section talks about the most visible
change to date-altering the criteria for the admissibility of expert
testimony.
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
In 1993, the Supreme Court redirected the, law of evidence with re-
spect to expert testimony in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.10 3 The legal issue in the case was a narrow one-whether the
Frye general acceptance test 10 4 for the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence survived the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in the
1970s. The court concluded that it did not.10 5 Once it dispensed with
the Frye rule, the Daubert opinion devoted its attention to outlining
the trial judge's gate keeping role.10 6
Daubert replaced the general acceptance test with a new test fo-
cused upon the issue of scientific validity. 0 7 The opinion set forth
four non-exclusive factors courts could use to assess admissibility: (a)
scientific validity (whether the test or theory underlying an expert's
testimony is testable and falsifiable); (b) the error rate associated with
a given test (unreliable procedures may merit exclusion); (c) whether
the theory or technique has been subject to peer review and whether
mony on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1993) (arguing for bifurcation in
complex cases).
102. Vidmar, supra note 25, at 908; see Development in the Law: The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 1408, 1498 (1997).
103. 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).
104. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). According to the Frye test, scientific
evidence should be admitted only when the scientific principle upon which the expert's testi-
mony is based is "sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs." Id. at 1014.
105. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
106. Id. at 592-95.
107. The Daubert test is centered on the idea of scientific validity. See MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 1-45 (David Faigman et al. eds., 1997); Black et al., supra note 97, at 745; Joseph
Sanders, Scientific Validity, Admissibility, and Mass Torts After Daubert, 78 MINN. L. REv. 1387,
1390 (1994).
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the results have been published; and (d) in a partial resurrection of the
Frye test, whether the expert's methods and reasoning enjoy general
acceptance in a relevant scientific community.108 In recent years
many courts have begun to consider a fifth factor, whether the ex-
pert's research was created for the purposes of litigation.10 9
In addition, the Daubert court noted that Federal Rule of Evidence
702110 requires that the scientific evidence must "assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." '111 It
noted that "[t]his condition goes primarily to relevance .... The con-
sideration has been aptly described by Judge Becker as one of 'fit.' "11 2
"'Fit' is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one purpose is
not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes."'113
Several "fit" analyses in the following years excluded expert testimony
because the judge concluded that the evidence available to an expert
did not address the particular disputed fact questions posed by the
case, 114 i.e., there was no fit between the data and the conclusions the
expert wished to draw.
108. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94.
109. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995); In re TMI
Litig. Cases Consol. 11, 922 F. Supp. 1038, 1054 (M.D. Penn. 1996).
110. Rule 702 now reads:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise.
FED. R. EvID. 702.
Recently, the Advisory Committee on Evidence has promulgated amendments to Rules 701,
702, and 703. These changes seek to make explicit what the Supreme Court found to be the
implicit meaning of Rule 702. The proposed Rule 702 reads:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise, provided that (1) the testimony is sufficiently based upon
reliable facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and meth-
ods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of
the case.
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judical Conference of the United States,
Preliminary Draft of the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Federal Rules of Evidence (1991) [hereinafter Committee on Rules].
111. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 743 (3d Cir. 1994); see General Elec. v.
Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).
[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court
to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of
the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap be-
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Many commentators and indeed many courts have assumed that
Daubert set a lower threshold of admissibility than Frye.115 In one
respect this is true. A theory or technique may not have reached gen-
eral acceptance and yet would be admissible under Daubert. How-
ever, it is also true that general acceptance does not insure
admissibility if a theory is untested, and courts are less willing to allow
experts to draw unsupportable inferences from existing evidence.
Rhetoric aside, courts, especially federal courts, are less willing to ad-
mit marginal expert testimony than they were pre-Daubert. Within the
area of toxic torts, where many cases involve complex scientific evi-
dence questions, the courts are much more likely to look behind the
assertions of an expert to the data and theories supporting those
assertions.
For example, with respect to testimony based on epidemiological
research, expert opinion, which is premised on a number of well-
designed, large studies that indicate a strong and statistically signifi-
cant relationship between the exact substance to which the plaintiff
was exposed and the exact injury the plaintiff has suffered at a dose
rate identical to that the plaintiff is known to have experienced, is
always admitted. As each of these factors (number of studies, design
of studies, strength of the relationship, statistical significance of the
relationship, substance similarity, injury similarity, dose rate similar-
ity) is removed, the value of the epidemiological research is weakened
and the admissibility of the testimony becomes more problematical.
A few examples from recent cases will indicate the nature of the issues
involved.
Number of Studies: The number and quality of epidemiological
studies is sometimes cited as a reason for an admissibility decision. In
Allen v. Pennsylvania Engineering Corp.,116 the court cited a lack of
positive epidemiological studies linking Ethylene Oxide ("EtO") ex-
posure to brain cancer as a reason to exclude plaintiff's expert's testi-
mony.1 17 Similarly, in National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chemical
Co.," 8 the court noted there was a single study on the effects of expo-
tween the data and the opinion proffered. That is what the District Court did here and
we hold that it did not abuse its discretion in so doing.
Id. at 519. A fit analysis often shades into a question of scientific validity. See National Bank of
Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 965 F. Supp. 1490, 1496 (E.D. Ark. 1996).
115. See Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 517.
116. 102 F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 1996).
117. Id. at 197. Nelson v. American Sterilizer Co. was another EtO case that reached a similar
result. 566 N.W.2d 671 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). It is important to note that there had been a good
deal of epidemiological research on the adverse effects of EtO.
118. 965 F. Supp. at 1519.
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sure to Dursban on fetal development, and it failed to show a
relationship."19
Substance Similarity: The Supreme Court, in its recent Joiner opin-
ion,120 affirmed the trial court's exclusion of plaintiff's experts in part
on the basis of the lack of substance similarity.' 2 ' Two of the four
epidemiological studies relied upon by plaintiffs to show a causal rela-
tionship between PCB exposure and cancer in fact had involved other
substances.'22 One involved mineral oil and did not mention PCBs,
while the other involved workers exposed to numerous potential car-
cinogens, including toxic rice oil that they had ingested. 2 3
Injury Similarity: Plaintiffs frequently allege that a substance known
to cause one type of harm has caused them to suffer a different type of
harm. Admissibility decisions often turn on the court's assessment of
the degree of similarity between the two types of injuries. For exam-
ple, in Valentine v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co., Inc.,124 plaintiffs claimed
that exposure to chlorine caused damage to their brain and central
nervous system. 25 Although chlorine gas is known to be toxic and to
do serious damage to an individual's pulmonary system (it is a major
component of mustard gas), the court disallowed the testimony of one
expert and allowed the testimony of a second only if he could point to
specific research linking chlorine gas exposure to neural injuries.126
Dosage: Dosage is often a problem for plaintiffs in cases involving
exposures to chemicals in the workplace or elsewhere. Sometimes,
the problem is simply one of a lack of evidence. In Allen v. Penn-
sylvania Engineering Corp.,127 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the exclusion
on both Rule 702 and Rule 703 grounds of expert testimony that
workplace exposure to EtO caused the plaintiff's decedent's brain
cancer, in part because of the difficulty of establishing his workplace
119. Id.
120. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512.
121. Id. at 519.
122. Id. at 518-19.
123. Id. at 519. Likewise, in Schudel v. General Elec. Co., 120 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 1997), the
plaintiffs expert testified that the plaintiff suffered from solvent-induced toxic encephalopathy
due to exposure to the solvents trichloroethane ("TCA") and perchloroethylene ("Perc") based
on studies that involved organic solvents other than TCA or Perc. Id. at 996-97. Following a
jury verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant appealed the trial court decision to admit this testi-
mony. Id. at 996. The appellate court concluded that admitting the testimony was in error, not-
ing the plaintiff's expert agreed that the mechanism of neurotoxicity from TCA and Perc had not
been demonstrated. Id. at 997.
124. 921 F. Supp. 666 (D. Nev. 1996).
125. Id. at 668.
126. Id. at 677.
127. 102 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 1996).
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exposure.'2 8 The court noted, "The experts actually knew more about
Allen's exposure to EtO through his smoking a pack of cigarettes a
day than they did about his occupational exposure to the chemical.' 29
Sometimes dosages are known, or can reasonably be estimated, and
the exposure experienced by the plaintiff is sufficiently below the
known levels of toxicity that a court will conclude expert opinions
claiming there is a causal relationship between exposure and the
plaintiff's illness are inadmissible. In Sutera v. The Perrier Group of
America,130 the plaintiff alleged that regular consumption of Perrier
sparkling mineral water caused him to contract acute promyelocytic
leukemia ("APL").'31 During the time the plaintiff consumed the
product it was sufficiently contaminated with benzene that the U.S.
FDA ordered a recall of some flavors produced between January 1989
and February 1990.132 The court concluded that the plaintiff's expert's
opinion that there was a "probable causal relationship" between the
plaintiff's leukemia and benzene exposure was not based on reliable
scientific evidence, primarily because the plaintiff's level of exposure
was far below the exposure shown to cause leukemia in epidemiologi-
cal and animal studies.1 33
128. Id. at 196-99.
129. Id. at 198; see Wintz v. Northrop Corp., 110 F.3d 508, 513 (7th Cir. 1997); Cuevas v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 956 F. Supp 1306, 1312 (S.D. Miss. 1997); Valentine, 921 F. Supp. at
676. In some cases the plaintiff may not be able to prove that he was even exposed to the
chemical in question. Mascarenas v. Miles, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 582 (W.D. Mo. 1997).
130. 986 F. Supp. 655 (D. Mass. 1997).
131. Id. at 656.
132. Id. at 657.
133. Id. at 662. See General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997), in which the Supreme
Court affirmed a trial court exclusion of expert opinion that the plaintiff's PCB exposure caused
his cancer insofar as it was based on animal studies showing that infant (but not adult) mice
developed cancer after exposure to PCBs. Id. at 519. The mice had massive doses of highly
concentrated PCBs injected directly into their peritoneums or stomachs. Joiner's exposure was
much lower. Id. at 518. In addition, the mice contracted a different type of cancer than the
plaintiff. Id.
In Schudel v. General Electric Corp., 120 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 1997), the court concluded that
studies involving long-term, low chemical concentrations or short-term exposure at very high
concentrations could not form the basis of an expert's opinion that short-term moderate-level
exposure caused plaintiff's injury. Id. at 997. "Extrapolation was necessary to make the studies
relevant, and there was no showing that the necessary extrapolation was scientifically accepta-
ble." Id.
In Wright v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 91 F.3d 1105 (8th Cir. 1996), the court reversed a
judgment on a verdict for the plaintiff after concluding there was no valid data upon which to
conclude that the plaintiffs had been exposed to a harmful dose of formaldehyde embedded in
wood fiber particles. ld. at 1107-08.
Dosage was also an issue in the Three Mile Island litigation. In In re TMI Litigation Consoli-
dated Proceedings, 927 F. Supp. 834 (M.D. Pa. 1996), the plaintiffs offered the testimony of a
number of experts that radiation exposure caused plaintiffs' injuries that were premised on a
dose in excess of 100 rems. Id. at 863. However, the key expert witness who originally was to
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Strength of Relationship and Statistical Significance: In Joiner, one of
the plaintiff's epidemiological studies was minimized because the rela-
tionship failed to reach statistical significance. 134 The strength of the
relationship shown by the study is also part of the admissibility
calculus.
Totality of Defects: Examining cases in terms of their discussion of
each single methodological flaw helps us to understand the types of
considerations that go into current admissibility decisions. However,
this approach suggests greater arbitrariness across cases than in fact
exists. In most cases where the judge has excluded the expert's testi-
mony, the research upon which the expert premises his opinion has
more than one flaw. This is true of most of the above cases. For an
example we need look no further than the Supreme Court's recent
Joiner opinion.135 The plaintiff's expert testimony in Joiner involved
at least three separate problems: substance similarity, injury similarity,
and dose rate.136 More often than not, it is the combination of
problems rather than any single shortcoming that leads to a decision
to exclude. 137 Multiple defects were observed by the trial judge in
Valentine v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co. Inc., 38 Schudel v. General Elec-
tric Corp.,139 Sutera v. The Perrier Group of America, Inc.,140 and
Wright v. Willamette Industries, Inc. 14 1 It is the combination of
problems that often causes the court to conclude both that the ex-
pert's methods are unreliable and that there is a lack of fit between
the research and the causal question in the case.1 42
testify that plaintiffs' actually were exposed to this level of radiation "recanted the bulk of his
opinions in an unsolicited voicemail message left with counsel for Defendants." Id. Absent this
testimony, the testimony of the other experts no longer fit the facts of the case and the judge
granted the defendant a summary judgment on sufficiency grounds. Id. at 870-71.
134. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 518.
135. Id. at 516.
136. Id.
137. It is possible, of course, for a decision to exclude to be based on a single factor. In TMI
Litigation, 927 F. Supp. 834, dosage problems alone seem to have sufficed to grant the defendant
a summary judgment on sufficiency grounds. Id. at 850.
138. 921 F. Supp. 666 (D. Nev. 1996) (injury similarity, dosage, and study design).
139. 120 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 1997) (dosage and substance similarity).
140. 986 F. Supp. 655 (D. Mass. 1997) (dosage and injury similarity).
141. 91 F.3d 1105 (8th Cir. 1996) (dosage and substance similarity).
142. In a recent article, Daniel Capra reviewed recent admissibility cases and argued that the
courts have focused on several "red flag" factors that are considered relevant when assessing
whether an expert's testimony is reliable. Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 GA. L. REV.
699 (1998). They are:
(1) improper extrapolation, i.e., drawing an inappropriate conclusion from an accepted
premise, (2) reliance on anecdoctal evidence as when an expert bases an opinion solely
on personal experience with patients or on only a few case studies, (3) reliance on
temporal proximity-concluding a substance caused an injury solely because the injury
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In addition, courts seem more willing to exclude testimony based on
an expert's lack of qualifications. Representative of such cases is
Mancuso v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York. 143 There, the court
concluded that an internist did not have the requisite qualifications to
testify that the plaintiff's ailments were caused by exposure to PCBs.
The internist lacked formal training and credentials in PCB toxicology
or in environmental or occupational medicine. 144 The internist was
unable to answer basic questions about PCB toxicology (e.g. what
levels of PCB contamination would be dangerous to humans) and re-
lied upon the plaintiffs' attorney to provide him with the scientific
literature he relied upon to support his opinion.145
The timing of Daubert and its progeny is as important as their con-
tent. The Federal Rules of Evidence had been in place for nearly
twenty years, and for much of that period there had been a disagree-
ment among the circuits as to whether the Rules incorporated Frye.146
Yet only in the mid-1990s did the Supreme Court take the time to
resolve the issue. Why then? Arguably, one important reason was the
growth of scientific expert testimony in court.
appeared shortly after exposure, (4) lack of relationship between an expert's testimony
and the facts of the case, (5) failure to consider other causes, (6) lack of testing, and (7)
subjectivity demonstrated by an inability to explain a methodology in objective terms.
Id. at 714. Capra's factors, like the factors discussed above, are part of the developing body of
criteria courts are using to flesh out the admissibility skeleton provided by Daubert. As is the
case with the factors I have proposed in the text, Capra notes that with respect to his red flags,
none is dispositive, "but each has been considered as cutting against admissiblity." Id.
143. 967 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
144. Id. at 1445.
145. Id. at 1443-45; see Sutera, 986 F. Supp. at 667. Plaintiff's expert, an oncologist and hema-
tologist with no expertise in epidemiology, toxicology, biostatistics or risk-assessment, lacked the
specific knowledge, education, training and experience to render an opinion as to whether the
exposures to low levels of benzene in Perrier for a short time period caused the plaintiff's leuke-
mia. Id.; see Wintz v. Northrop Corp., 110 F.3d 508, 512-13 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting expert, a
toxicologist, was not a licenced physician and lacked sufficient expertise in birth defects bromide
exposure, or the specific birth defect from which the plaintiff suffered to testify that bromide
exposure to the mother during her pregnancy caused the plaintiff's injury); Everett v. Georgia-
Pacific Corp., 949 F. Supp. 856, 857-58 (S.D. Ga. 1996) (noting that the expert, practicing family
medicine and surgery, possessed no specialized knowledge or training in the field of toxicology);
Muzzy v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 921 F. Supp. 511, 521 (N.D. I11. 1996) (holding witnesses
without expertise in hematology were not qualified to testify whether plaintiff's exposure to
radiation from refining byproduct caused her to contract the disease polycythemia vera).
146. For example, the Third Circuit noted that the status of the Frye test was uncertain under
the Federal Rules, but rejected it on policy grounds in United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224,
1232 (3d Cir. 1985). On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit retained the Fyre test until reversed in
the Daubert case. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129 (9th Cir. 1991).
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The growth was accompanied by the belief among some that there
has been an increase in "junk science" in the courtroom, 147 requiring
greater judicial vigilance in admitting expert opinion. 148 For example,
the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules had pro-
posed a change to Federal Rule 702 that would allow expert testimony
only if the testimony is "reasonably reliable and will substantially as-
sist the factfinder."'1 49 By this language, the Advisory Committee in-
tended to curtail the use of expert testimony. 50 These developments
were not lost on the Supreme Court.
The post-Daubert admissibility opinions, nevertheless, might have
established a lower threshold for admissibility had courts believed that
jurors were well situated to distinguish between valid and invalid sci-
entific conclusions. However, the adversarial system makes this less
likely. As Michael Saks and Roselle Wissler note:
In civil litigation.., all manner of experts are found to testify oppo-
site their colleagues.
Whether such "balancing" of expert witnesses helps the fact
finder evaluate their testimony is another matter. The search for
witnesses that is driven by the adversary process may result in a
distortion of knowledge when applied to expert witnesses. For ex-
ample, if 999 of every 1000 experts in a given field hold one view of
a question and one holds an alternate view, the two experts who
appear in court will have been detached from the extremely skewed
147. PETER HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991); PETER
HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988).
148. See Chaulk v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 808 F.2d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 1986); Stoleson v.
United States, 708 F.2d 1217, 1222 (7th Cir. 1983); Donald E. Elliott, Toward Incentive-Based
Procedure: Three Approaches for Regulating Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U. L. REV. 487 (1989);
Barry M. Epstein & Marc S. Klein, The Use and Abuse of Expert Testimony in Product Liability
Actions, 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 656 (1987); Michael McCarthy, "Helpful" or "Reasonably Reli-
able?": Analyzing the Expert Witness's Methodology Under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and
703, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 350 (1992).
149. Committee on Rules, supra note 110, at 83. The proposed Rule 702 would read:
Testimony providing scientific, technical, or other specialized information in the form
of an opinion or otherwise, may be permitted only if (1) the information is reasonably
reliable and will substantially assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, and (2) the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education to provide such testimony.
Id.
150. The committee noted with respect to these changes:
[T]he revision requires that expert testimony be "reasonably reliable" and "substan-
tially assist" the fact-finder. The rule does not mandate a return to the strictures of
Frye v. United States, 293 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (requiring general acceptance of
the scientific premises on which the testimony is based). However, the court is called
upon to reject testimony that is based upon premises lacking any significant support
and acceptance within the scientific community or that otherwise would be only mar-
ginally helpful to the fact-finder.
Committee on Rules, supra note 110, at 84.
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distribution of opinion from which they were drawn. The fact finder
has no way of knowing this.1 51
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that in many cases both
sides tend to call a similar number of witnesses, and from the lay per-
son's perspective they all appear well credentialed. Elsewhere, I have
described this as the problem of the one-eyed fact-finder. 152 The jury
is not blind. It can "see" the expert testimony. What it lacks is depth
perception. The ability to properly weigh the evidence. All experts
appear qualified and all evidence of equal value and relevance.15 3
It is not surprising, therefore, that a fifth factor is emerging in many
post-Daubert admissibility rulings-a concern that the expert's re-
search and testimony was created for the purpose of litigation. In
many cases rejecting expert testimony, including a number of the
cases discussed above, the courts refer to this consideration.1 54
As Judge Posner put the issue in Braun v. Lorillard, Inc.:155
The Supreme Court held in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc. that the opinion evidence of reputable scientists is admissi-
ble in evidence in a federal trial even if the particular methods they
used in arriving at their opinion are not yet accepted as canonical in
their branch of the scientific community. But that is only part of the
holding of Daubert. The other part is that the district court is re-
151. Michael J. Saks & Roselle L. Wissler, Legal and Psychological Bases of Expert Testi-
mony: Surveys of the Law and of Jurors, 2 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 435, 439-40 (1984). Samuel Gross
provides an example of this phenomenon from psychiatry.
[P]sychiatrists today have overwhelmingly rejected the notion that they can predict fu-
ture violence-let alone do so on the basis of hypothetical questions-but psychiatric testi-
mony to the contrary is regularly heard in court, and is a basis of many death sentences.
It is common to point out how the structure of legal proceedings can distort the jury's
view of a field of knowledge. The universe of psychiatrists may consist of a hundred
experts, of whom one believes in predictions of dangerousness and ninety-nine do not,
but the list of witnesses in a particular case will probably include one expert on each
side of this fictitious divide. It is less commonly noted that the one expert who will
testify to the discredited point of view is probably in greater demand as a witness, more
experienced in court, and more effective.
Gross, supra note 18, at 1184-85.
152. JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECrTIN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF MASS TORT LITIGATION 130
(1998).
153. Id.
154. Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Although [Dr. Alan]
Done published the 1984 article prior to this litigation, he was at that time already a professional
plaintiffs witness. It is not unreasonable to presume that Done's opinion on Clomid was influ-
enced by a litigation-driven financial incentive."); Muzzey v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 921 F.
Supp. 511, 519 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("I also find significant the fact that none of these witnesses has
done any research on this theory outside the context of this lawsuit."); Cuevas v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 956 F. Supp. 1306, 1312 (S.D. Miss. 1997); Valentine v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali
Co., Inc., 921 F. Supp. 666, 670 (D. Nev. 1996); In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II, 922 F. Supp.
1038, 1054 (M.D. Penn. 1996).
155. 84 F.3d 230, 234-35 (7th Cir. 1996).
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sponsible for making sure that when scientists testify in court they
adhere to the same standards of intellectual rigor that are de-
manded in their professional work. 156
On the other hand, when research has been conducted independent
of the litigation this weighs in favor of admissibility. 157 An interesting
recent case in point is Zuchowicz v. United States, 58 in which the
plaintiff's wife died from a fatal lung condition allegedly caused by a
negligently prescribed overdose of the drug Danocrine. 159 According
to the plaintiff's experts, because of the rareness of primary pulmo-
nary hypertension and the lack of any formal research on the effects
of the drug at this high dose rate, they could not point to specific re-
search supporting their conclusion that the drug caused the decedent's
illness. 60 However, they could point to studies showing other agents,
such as birth control pills, some appetite suppressants, and chemother-
apy drugs, that cause this illness.161 Moreover, the experts were able
to provide a biologically plausible reason why the drug could cause
this effect and were able to show that the decedent had no history of
cardiovascular problems prior to taking the drug. 62 Judge Calabresi,
writing for the Second Circuit, concluded that the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion in admitting the expert testimony. 63 Clearly, the
court was impressed by the credentials of the plaintiff's experts, their
independent research on the issue in question, and the fact that they
were not routinely in the business of providing expert testimony in
tort litigation. 164 These factors weighed in favor of admissibility.
In sum, the renewed judicial activism ushered in by Daubert is in
part an effort to monitor whether experts are behaving as they would
were they not in the courtroom. It is an effort to exclude from the
courtroom those experts who are prepared to make statements that
156. Id. at 234.
157. Berry v. CSX Transp., Inc., 709 So. 2d 552, 569 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998) ("Our conclusion [to
admit] is strongly influenced by the fact that the epidemiological studies here were conducted
independently of this litigation and were peer-reviewed and accepted by journals that are widely
acknowledged in the scientific and medical communities.").
158. 140 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1998).
159. Id. at 386.
160. Id. at 385.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 387.
164. The plaintiff's experts were Dr. Richard Matthay, a professor of medicine at Yale and
Associate Director and Training Director of Yale's Pulmonary and Critical Care Section and Dr.
Randall Tackett, a professor of pharmacology and former department chair from the University
of Georgia, who had published widely in the field of the effects of drugs on vascular tissues. Id.
at 385-86. A Westlaw search failed to find the names of these two experts in any other published
opinions.
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support the interests of the party who hired them but that are unsup-
ported by valid scientific evidence. Post-Daubert cases use evidence
law in an attempt to weaken the link between the parties and their
experts and, therefore, the link between adversarialism and jury deci-
sion making.
IV. OTHER EVIDENTIARY AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES
Evidentiary admissibility rulings are perhaps the most visible judi-
cial response to the growth of complex scientific evidence, but they
are not alone. This section briefly reviews several additional devices
employed by the legal system. As we shall see, they all share the attri-
bute that they alter the jury-evidence-adversarial process mix in re-
sponse to the problem posed by complex cases.
Court appointed experts: The response most similar to admissibility
rulings is the use of court-appointed experts. Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 706 permits the court on its own motion or at the request of one
or more of the parties to appoint expert witnesses not aligned with
either party.165 Although admissibility rules may shield jurors from
the most unreliable and most partisan testimony, they do not assist
them in understanding the complex evidence they do hear. When all
evidence is presented by party experts, there is a tendency for differ-
ences to be exaggerated and for scientific consensus to be sup-
165. Rule 706 reads:
(a) Appointment. The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party
enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may
request the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert wit-
nesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selec-
tion. An expert witness shall not be appointed by the court unless the witness consents
to act. A witness so appointed shall be informed of the witness' duties by the court in
writing, a copy of which shall be filed with the clerk, or at a conference in which the
parties shall have opportunity to participate. A witness so appointed shall advise the
parties of his findings, if any; his deposition may beaken by any party; and he may be
called to testify by the court or any party. He shall be subject to cross-examination by
each party, including a party calling the witness.
(b) Compensation. Expert witnesses so appointed are entitled to reasonable compen-
sation in whatever sum the court may allow. The compensation thus fixed is payable
from funds which may be provided by law in criminal cases and civil actions and pro-
ceedings involving just compensation under the fifth amendment. In other civil actions
and proceedings the compensation shall be paid by the parties in such proportion and
at such time as the court directs, and thereafter charged in like manner as other costs.
(c) Disclosure of appointment. In the exercise of its discretion, the court may author-
ize disclosure to the jury of the fact that the court appointed the expert witness.
(d) Parties' experts of own selection. Nothing in this rule limits the parties in calling
expert witnesses of their own selection.
FED. R. EVID. 706.
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pressed. 166 As Gross notes, this produces an environment in which
"disagreements are all but inevitable, areas of agreement are under-
emphasized or ignored, disputes in the field are magnified, and the
consensus of experts, if any, is obscured. '' 167 Less tainted by partisan-
ship, court appointed experts may identify areas where little disagree-
ment in the scientific community exists, thereby narrowing the range
of controversy. Cross-examination of these experts may focus less on
witness competence and integrity, and more on areas where scientific
evidence is in genuine dispute.
Despite frequent calls for the increased use of court-appointed ex-
perts, 168 historically they have been used sparingly. A survey of pub-
lished federal opinions through 1985 by the Federal Judicial Center
uncovered only forty-five references to Rule 706 and thirty-seven
cases in which an appointment was made or extensively discussed. 169
The Federal Judicial Center also surveyed 431 Federal District Court
judges and found that 80% had never appointed an expert under Rule
706, while 11% had done so only once.170 Gross' study of 529 civil
cases in California found that while over 1,700 experts were called,
none were court appointed, even though California's Evidence Code
has a provision similar to Rule 706.171
This poor track record apparently has not been due to judicial hos-
tility. Judges are not enamored with party experts. Seventy-nine per-
cent of the judges a study by Shuman and his colleagues did not think
party expert witnesses could be depended upon to be impartial and
57% thought of experts as "hired guns" who gave biased testimony. 172
According to recent surveys, many judges support the appointment of
166. Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science, 32
JURIMETRICS J. 345, 358 (1992).
167. Gross, supra note 18, at 1175. Damaska agrees. "The chass6-croisie of partisan queries
filters out information that does not clearly advance one of the two clashing positions. Common
ground in testimony is neglected and divergences magnified." DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW
ADRIFT, supra note 1, at 100.
168. See Elliot, supra note 94, at 501-04; Richard A. Epstein, A New Regime for Expert Wit-
nesses, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 757, 760 (1992); Gross, supra note 18, at 1188; Richard 0. Lempert,
Let's Not Rush to Judgment, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra note 56, at
124-26; Sanders, supra note 101, at 38-39.
169. THOMAS E. WILLGING, COURT APPOINTED EXPERTS 3 (1986).
170. JOE S. CECIL & THOMAS E. WILLGING, COURT APPOINTED EXPERTS: DEFINING THE
ROLE OF EXPERTS APPOINTED UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 706 (1993) [hereinafter
CECIL & WILLGING, DEFINING THE ROLE]; Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting
Daubert's Invitation: Defining a Rule for Court-appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity,
43 EMORY L.J. 995 (1994); Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, The Use of Court-Appointed
Experts in Federal Courts, 78 JUDICATURE 41 (1994).
171. Gross, supra note 18, at 1191.
172. Shuman et al., supra note 20, at 202-03.
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an independent expert in cases involving technical or scientific issues.
Judges are deterred by other factors, such as unwillingness to devote
time and energy to select and supervise experts, or fear of reversal by
appellate courts if the judge appears to have been too active in creat-
ing the evidence in the case. 173 As Gross notes, however, the main
reason courts rarely appoint experts is a hostile bar fearful that court-
appointed experts will dominate the trial.
174
Although the use of court-appointed experts remains rare, there
have been recent cases involving complex scientific evidence where
they have been employed. The most noteworthy are two silicone
breast implant proceedings. 175
In Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,176 Judge Robert E. Jones ex-
cluded all testimony to the effect that silicone-gel breast implants
("SGBI") cause autoimmune system disorders.' 77 The court reached
this result after calling on four independent experts to advise it on the
state of scientific knowledge. 78 The Hall process began with a medi-
cal doctor who "assisted the court by screening dozens of potential
appointees and ultimately selecting four ... uncommitted experts.'
79
The district court then appointed those selected-an epidemiologist, a
rheumatologist, an immunologist-toxicologist, and a polymer chem-
ist-"to assist in evaluating the reliability and relevance of the scien-
tific evidence.' 80 These specialists served as "technical advisors"
rather than as experts appointed under Rule 706 of the Federal Rules
173. CECIL & WILLGING, DEFINING THE ROLE, supra note 170, at 11, 21.
174. Gross, supra note 18, at 1197-98. One laboratory study suggests that lawyers overesti-
mate the impact of court-appointed experts and that jurors do not give non-adversarial expert
testimony more weight than adversarial expert testimony. Brekke et al., supra note 94, at 468-
69.
175. It is estimated that between one and two million women have received implants to en-
large or reconstruct their breasts. See, e.g., Charlotte Allen, Jurisprudence of Breasts, 5 STAN. L.
& POL'Y REV. 83, 84 (1994). But see Ralph R. Cook et al., The Prevalence of Women With Breast
Implants in the United States-1989, 48 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 519 (1995) (reporting that a
random survey of 40,000 households in the United States shows that in 1989 there were approxi-
mately 815,000 women with implants). In 1996, there were between 450,000 and 500,000 claim-
ants. In re Dow Corning Corp. (Lindsey), 86 F.3d 482, 485 (6th Cir. 1996); Francis E. McGovern,
An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1821 (1995). It is well known that im-
plants can leak, rupture, or cause painful contractures. However, the association with other
conditions is more questionable. Silicone Gel Breast Implants: The Report of the Independent
Review Group (U.K.) (visited Oct. 6, 1998) <http://www.silicone-review.gov.uk>.
176. 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996).
177. Id. at 1394.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1393.
180. Id. at 1392.
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of Evidence. 181 Along with counsel and the court, the advisors ques-
tioned the parties' witnesses. 182 After viewing videotaped summa-
tions from counsel, they submitted written reports. 183 Counsel then
had the opportunity to question them. 184 After considering the advi-
sory experts' reports and the other submissions, the court granted de-
fendants' motions "to exclude expert testimony concerning causation
of any systemic disease or syndrome. '1 85
The federal silicone implant cases are being handled under the Mul-
tidistrict Litigation Act.186 By October 1994, the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation had transferred approximately 9,600 cases to
Judge Pointer in the Northern District of Alabama for pretrial pro-
ceedings. 187 In 1996, Judge Pointer appointed a Rule 706 panel con-
sisting of four experts in the areas of immunology, epidemiology,
medicine, and toxicology. 188 Judge Pointer charged the panel to ad-
dress the extent to which "existing studies, research, and reported ob-
servations provide a reliable and reasonable scientific basis for one to
conclude that silicone-gel breast implants cause or exacerbate any of
the conditions described ... below?"'189 The order asked the panel to
181. Id. at 1393 n.8. Indeed, the court denied motions to appoint experts under Rule 706,
believing that this would insulate its advisors from depositions and testifying at trial. Id. at 1401.
The court reasoned that it had inherent authority to appoint such advisors. Id. at 1392.
182. Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1411. The chemist was appointed after the evidentiary hearing. Id.
The testimony was organized by field; that is, plaintiffs presented their experts in a particular
field, and defendants' witnesses in that field then testified. Id. at 1393.
183. Id.
184. Id. Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1393.
185. Id. Recently, a federal court in Louisiana granted the defendant a summary judgment in
a case involving a silicone penile implant. Pick v. American Med. Sys., 958 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D.
La. 1997). The court ruled that the plaintiff's evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to
establish a causal relationship between silicone and plaintiff's autoimmune disease. Id. at 1173.
186. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1997).
187. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. 926), 793 F. Supp. 1098
(J.P.M.L. 1992). Meanwhile, over 15,000 state court claims had been filed. William W.
Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism: A Proposal to Amend the Multidistrict Litigation Statute to
Permit Discovery Coordination of Large-Scale Litigation Pending in State and Federal Courts, 73
TEX. L. REV. 1529, 1530 (1995).
188. Silicone Gel Breast Implants,793 F. Supp. at 1100. In April, under the leadership of U.S.
District Judge Jack Weinstein, three judges in New York designated several experts from various
disciplines as special masters, and asked them to locate experts for appointment to a larger
expert panel that would consider general principles for establishing cause and effect in the SGBI
cases, giving "particular attention ... to claims respecting immune system dysfunction and con-
nective tissue and rheumatic disease." Eliot Marshall, New York Courts Seek "Neutral" Experts,
272 SCIENCE 189 (1996); see Mark Hansen, Panel to Examine Implant Evidence, A.B.A. J., June
1996, at 34. This panel was eventually put on hold when Judge Joiner appointed a panel in
Alabama. In re Breast Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. 1996).
189. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., (MDL-926), CV 92-P-10000-S (Oct.
31, 1996). The panel was asked "to consider the relationship, if any, between implants and the
following: 'classic' connective tissue diseases, such as systemic lupus erythematosus, Sjogren's
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state the extent to which the opinions it reaches are subject to suffi-
cient dispute that other qualified experts could express contrary opin-
ions that would be viewed as "representing legitimate and responsible
disagreement within your profession."1 90
Unlike the Oregon advisors, the national panel of experts has yet to
act. Nonetheless, it has affected SGBI litigation. The district courts in
New York cited the prospect of a report from the national panel as a
reason not to "rush to judgment,"1 91 and the Oregon district court
deferred the effective date of its ruling in Hall "until the findings of
the Rule 706 panel are available.' 92
The panel issued its report in December 1998.193 The report con-
tained separate chapters on animal studies, immunology, the epidemi-
ological research, and rheumatology. The panel concluded that the
evidence linking silicone implants to connective tissue and autoim-
mune disease in humans is very weak.194 The report probably will
have a significant impact on the future of this litigation. Some courts
have publicly stated that they were awaiting the panel report before
proceeding with pending cases. The district courts in New York cited
the prospect of a report from the national panel as a reason not to
"rush to judgment,"' 95 and the Oregon district court deferred the ef-
fective date of its ruling in Hall "until the findings of the Rule 706
syndrome, etc.; 'atypical' presentations of connective tissue diseases or symptoms; immune sys-
tem dysfunctions." Id. In an appendix to his order, the judge listed forty diseases, symptoms,
conditions, and complaints that some have asserted as possibly associated with silicone implants
and asked the panel to comment, where appropriate, on the scientific basis of a claimed linkage
between implants and the items on the list. Id. The panel was instructed not to consider purely
local complications arising from implants, such as breast disfigurement or capsular contracture.
Id.
190. Id.
191. In re Breast Implant Cases, No. 92 CV 7821 (lead) (S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 1996)
(Amended Preliminary Memorandum).
192. Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1394 (D. Or. 1996).
193. Betty A. Diamond et al., Silicone Breast Implants in Relation to Connective Tissue Dis-
ease and Immunologic Dysfunction: A Report by a National Science Panel to the Honorable
Sam C. Pointer Jr., Coordinating Judge for the Federal Breast Implant Multi-District Litigation.
<http://www.fjc.gov/BREIMLIT/ SCIENCE/report.htm>.
194. The panel drew the following conclusion with respect to the animal study research: "Con-
sidering the broad range of testing systems that have been used in the study of silicone effects,
the toxicological and immunologic responses are few in number and questionable in signifi-
cance." Diamond et al., supra note 193, at 5. With respect to the immunological research the
panel stated, "The main conclusion that can be drawn from existing studies is that women with
silicone breast implants do not display a silicone-induced systematic abnormality in the types or
functions of cells of the immune system." Id. at 6. As to the epidemiological evidence, the panel
reported that with the possible exception of Sjogren's syndrome, "no association was evident
between breast implants and any of the individual connective tissue diseases, all definite connec-
tive diseases combined, or the other autoimmune/rheumatic conditions." Id.
195. Breast Implant Cases, No. 92 CV 7821.
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panel are available. ' 196 Presumably, many other courts will be influ-
enced by the panel when asked to make admissibility and sufficiency
rulings when the multi-district cases are referred back to their home
districts for trial.197
Two cases, of course, do not establish a trend. However, it is worth
noting that when confronted with similar scientific uncertainty in the
early stages of previous mass torts, such as Bendectin and asbestos,
the courts did not turn to this device. Moreover, judicial support for
the greater use of Rule 706 experts is on the rise. Most notable in this
regard is Justice Bryer's concurring opinion in Joiner. Bryer wrote
separately to emphasize the availability of court appointed experts
and other procedural devices that would assist courts to parse difficult
scientific and technical subjects.198 Finally, there is some evidence
that the use of 706 experts is increasing in frequency. The Federal
Judicial Center has replicated their earlier survey of published federal
opinions for mentions of 706. The results suggest that there is a small
increase in the use of court appointed experts. 199
Procedural Devices: A number of procedural devices have also been
used to simplify the jury task in complex cases. Perhaps the most
noteworthy is bifurcation. In recent years a number of states have
authorized the separation of the punitive damage phase from the rest
of a trial.200 Here, I am more interested in bifurcation that separates
the causal question from other elements of the cause of action. Typi-
cally, the court first tries the causal question, and only if the plaintiff
prevails is the rest of the case tried.201 Federal Rule of Procedure
196. Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1394.
197. The Multidistrict Litigation Act ("MLA") is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1407. For a recent
discussion of the limited role of the MDL court after discovery, see Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg,
Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach, 118 S. Ct. 956 (1998).
198. General Elec. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512, 519 (1997).
199. The Federal Judicial Center conducted a Lexis search of all Federal District Court deci-
sions since 1985 for the term "court-appointed experts." The average mentions in the five- year
period from 1989 through 1993 (the year Daubert was decided) was 35 per year. In the years
1994-1998 (through the middle of October) there were on average 59 mentions per year. Per-
sonal correspondence from Joe Cecil to Joseph Sanders, October 23, 1998.
200. See Stephan Landsman et al., Be Careful What You Wish For: The Paradoxical Effects of
Bifurcating Claims for Punitive Damages, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 395; Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury
Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDIsC. L.J. 1, 33
n.109 (1997).
201. Cecil et al., supra note 31, at 767-78; Norman G. Poythress et al., Refraining the Medical
Malpractice Tort Reform Debate: Social Science Research Implications for Non-economic Re-
forms, 16 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 65, 107 (1992); Sanders, supra note 101; Franklin Strier, Mak-
ing Jury Trials More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 95 (1996).
While most proposals to bifurcate trials in mass exposure cases assume the causal question
should be tried first, there is no logical reason why this should be so. The liability issue could
also be tried first. Existing research suggests there is a significant bifurcation effect regardless of
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42(b) permits a separate trial of issues for reasons of convenience,
economy, expedition, or to avoid prejudice.20 2 Similarly, Rule
23(c)(4)(A) permits separation of issues in class actions.20 3 Most state
civil procedure codes have similar provisions.20 4 Economy and expe-
dition justify bifurcation in those mass exposure cases with many
plaintiffs or many defendants.20 5 Judge Rubin used this justification
for bifurcating a Bendectin trial involving over 800 plaintiffs.20 6 He
calculated that the trial of all 1,100 then existing Bendectin cases
would require 182 judge years.20 7 Trying even 5% would consume
nine judge years.208 Because the defendant prevailed before the jury
on the general causation question, a trial on liability and damages was
unnecessary.
Recently, the trial judge bifurcated the trial in the protracted Paoli
Railroad Yard litigation.20 9 After a thirteen day trial, consisting pri-
marily of expert opinion, the jury found that none of the plaintiffs had
been "significantly exposed" to PCBs from the Yard and the PCBs
from the Yard had not damaged the plaintiffs' property.210 The Third
Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' argument that this decision violated
their Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury.21' It went on to say:
In the case at bar, the interests of judicial economy and convenience
counseled strongly in favor of severing the issues relating to plain-
the order in which a case is tried. See Horowitz & Bordens, supra note 101, at 277-79. Bifurca-
tion, like court appointed experts, is an idea that has been suggested and opposed for over 50
years. See Jack Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trials: An Example of the
Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND. L. REv. 831, 834 (1961).
202. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b). The Rule reads:
Separate trials. The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when
separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial
of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim or of any separate issue or
any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims or issues, always
preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment of
the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States.
Id.
203. FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(c)(4)(a).
204. See Doyle W. Curry & Rosemary Snider, Bifurcated Trials: How to Avoid Them-How to
Win Them, TRIAL, Mar. 1988, at 47, 51 n.3.
205. See Cecil et al., supra note 31, at 767, for a list of cases where issues have been separated
for trial in the areas of antitrust, patent and personal injury.
206. In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., "Bendectin" Prods. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio
1985).
207. Id. at 1221 n.6.
208. Id.
209. In re Paoli R.R.Yard PCB Litig., 113 F.3d 444 (3d Cir. 1997). For another recent case
where the causal question was separated, see Jeter v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 716 A.2d
633 (Pa. Super. 1998).
210. Paoli, 113 F.3d at 452.
211. Id.
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tiffs' exposure to PCBs and causation of their injuries from the is-
sues of defendants' culpability. Phase I focused on plaintiffs'
exposure to PCBs while Phase II would have concerned whether
the conduct of several railroad operators and manufacturers caused
that exposure. The trial of the Phase I issues alone lasted three
weeks and involved dozens of witnesses. Resolution of the Phase I
issues obviated the need for a trial on the issues of the defendants'
liability, which undoubtedly would have taken months and would
have involved issues more complicated than the Phase I trial, all at
additional cost to the parties. Thus, bifurcation preserved judicial
resources and reduced the expenses of the parties, and the district
court did not abuse its discretion in ordering such a process.2 12
It is a closer question whether bifurcation can be justified on the
basis of economy and expedition in cases with single plaintiffs and sin-
gle defendants. 213 Within the context of this paper, however, the case
for bifurcation rests primarily on the argument that it would improve
jury performance by focusing their full attention on complex causal
questions and for this reason it might have a place in some single
plaintiff, single defendant cases as well.
Bifurcation does appear to alter jury outcomes, generally by pro-
ducing more defense verdicts. 214 Are such outcomes superior? There
is some evidence supporting a conclusion that they are. A 1989 Harris
Poll survey of federal and state court judges found that not only do the
judges believe bifurcation reduces transaction costs, 80% of the fed-
eral judges and 77% of the state judges also believe bifurcation had a
positive impact on the "fairness of the outcome. '215 More persua-
sively, perhaps, there is evidence that jurors hearing bifurcated cases
are less likely to trade off weak causal evidence against strong evi-
dence on liability or damages. Insofar as we believe that jurors should
212. Id. at 452 n.5.
213. Zeisel and Callahan studied the effects of a program instituted to encourage split trials in
the Northern District of Illinois in the early 1960s. Hans Zeisel & Thomas Callahan, Split Trials
and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1606 (1963). They found that bifur-
cated trials were on average shorter in duration than unitary trials. Id. at 1616. However, these
cases bifurcated liability and damages; there were no separate trials of the causal question.
214. Zeisel and Callahan report that in the Northern District of Illinois experiment defend-
ants prevailed in 56% of the bifurcated trials, but only 34% of the unitary trials. Id. at 1616 tbl.3.
In a laboratory experiment, using a toxic tort trial stimulus, Horowitz and Bordens found that
juries hearing a unitary trial were significantly more likely to find for the plaintiff (85%) than
were juries that heard trials in which causation, liability and damages were heard separately
(68%). Horowitz & Bordens, supra note 101, at 277-78. If juries in the bifurcated condition did
find for the plaintiff, however, their compensatory damages awards were significantly larger than
those of unitary juries. Id.
215. Louis Harris & Assocs., Judge's Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State and
Federal Trial Judges Who Spend at Least Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 731, 745 tbl.5.6 (1989).
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make independent decisions as to each element of a tort, there is evi-
dence that bifurcation will facilitate such decision-making.216
Other procedural devices suggested from time to time include re-
stricting the number of expert witnesses and the length of their testi-
mony,21 7 judicial questioning of witnesses, and summarizing and
commenting on the evidence. 218 There is no evidence, however, that
these devices are being used to a greater extent than in the past.
Aids to Jury Comprehension: Another set of procedural devices is
designed to improve jury comprehension of complex evidence. It in-
cludes jury note taking and jury questions during trial, improved judi-
cial instructions, reordering the presentation of expert testimony, and
interim discussions of the case prior to the end of the trial.219 It is
difficult to be precise but it seems that there are more calls for such
reforms 220 and that an increasing number of courts are at least open to
experimenting with these procedures.221
216. Jonathan D. Casper et al., Juror Decision Making, Attitudes, and the Hindsight Bias, 13
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 291, 306 (1989). Horowitz & Bordens, supra note 101, at 282. Not every-
one agrees that juries should decide cases this way. Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical
Proof, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 373 (1991), argued that "element decision making" is logically
flawed and is alien to the jury. Id. at 398. He concluded the law should be changed so that the
jury is instructed to "return a verdict for the parties whose [story] is more plausible." Id. at 409;
see Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 80.
217. District Court Judge Thomas Jackson has limited the number of witnesses the govern-
ment and Microsoft can call in the pending antitrust case against Microsoft. Judge Limits Wit-
nesses In Microsoft Antitrust Case, WALL ST. J., June 10, 1998, at B5. 'Judge Jackson plans to
hold both sides to six to 12 witnesses and limited their testimony at trial largely to cross-exami-
nation. Id.
218. For a discussion of these procedures, see Strier, supra note 201, at 175-82.
219. For a discussion of these procedures, see Fred Misko Jr. & Frank E. Goodrich, Managing
Complex Litigation: Class Actions and Mass Torts, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 1001, 1074-75 (1996);
Saks, supra note 200, at 1; David U. Strawn & G. Thomas Munsterman, Helping Juries Handle
Complex Cases, 65 JUDICATURE 444 (1982); Strier, supra note 201, at 137-42.
220. See Julie Gannon Shoop, ABA Section Says Jury Reforms Should Be Standard Practice;
ATLA Criticizes Proposals, TRIAL, Feb. 1998, at 86.
221. Penrod & Heuer, supra note 98, at 261. Arizona clearly is a leader in its willingness to
adopt innovations that strengthen the jury's role and permit it to be more active during the trial.
Natash K. Lakamp, Deliberating Juror Predeliberation Discussions: Should California Follow the
Arizona Model?, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 845 (1998); Lori Tripoli, Precipice of Change... Profes-
sional Groups Urge Striking Changes in Trial Practice, INSIDE LITIG., Mar. 1997, at 1.
The buzz in the legal community-in the states, at the federal level, among litigators,
and judges and jury consultants-is that participatory juries are the next wave. It's a
radical innovation meant, among other things, to address widespread skepticism about
the court system by involving the public in the trial process in a more direct way than
has ever been attempted in this country.
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CONCLUSION
Many of the devices discussed in the previous two sections, includ-
ing bifurcation and restrictions on who can testify, tend to strengthen
the trial judge vis-a-vis the jury and may, therefore, be seen as a way
of taking decision making from juries. Others, such as permitting note
taking and allowing juries to ask questions, have the effect of increas-
ing the jury's role and power in litigation. All, however, have one
thing in common. They loosen the connection between juries and the
adversarial nature of American trials, in part by altering the eviden-
tiary rules that govern the presentation of expert testimony. Some do
so by making the judge less passive, some do so by making the jury
less passive. Both approaches weaken party control over the trial pro-
cess. Both approaches facilitate jury decision making in complex
cases by altering the other components of the trial process, evidentiary
rules and adversarial processes.
Criticisms of adversarial proceedings are nothing new in our legal
system,222 nor are proposals to move toward a more inquisitorial form
of trial.223 What is interesting is the willingness of courts to move in
this direction on a number of fronts in cases involving complex scien-
tific questions. Traditionally judges saw their role as passive arbitra-
tors, afraid that any active role would threaten their status as neutral
and impartial referees. As Damaska notes, the primacy of neutrality
"is easy to understand: in a legal process whose ultimate objective is
conflict resolution, the adjudicator is first and foremost a neutral arbi-
ter. ''224 Likewise, jury passivity has long been the norm. Again, as
Damaska notes, "jurors have no proof initiative and are usually not
even permitted to ask questions of witnesses. While evidence is being
adduced, they sit silent, cast-one might say-into the role of potted
courtroom plants. ' 225 No more, or at least less and less in complex
scientific cases.
222. Perhaps the most famous critic of the adversarial system was JEROME FRANK, COURTS
ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1949). See John H. Langbein, The Ger-
man Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985) and Strier, supra note 201, at
142-52 for a comparison of the two systems and arguing for the advantages of an inquisitorial
system for the discovery of truth.
223. See JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS 22-27 (1975); E. Allan Lind et al., Discovery and Presentation of Evidence in Adver-
sary and Nonadversary Proceedings, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1140-43 (1973) (discussing research
indicating adversarial trials are less effective than inquisitorial trials at finding truth); John Thi-
baut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541 (1978).
224. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT, supra note 1, at 124.
225. Id. at 90.
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COMPLEX CASES
It is not the case, of course, that neutrality and impartiality are less
important virtues in such cases. Here, as elsewhere, they are bedrock
components of a sense of procedural justice. 226 They are, however, not
the only virtue. Accuracy is also fundamental as is a sense that the
fact finder understands and bases its decision on the merits of the
case.227 A fair interpretation of developments with respect to scientif-
ically complex tort cases is that the legal system has chosen to trade
some neutrality for potential improvements in jury comprehension
and hopefully in outcome accuracy.
Two further observations are in order about this development.
First, it is important to note the nature of these changes. Perceived
adversarial excesses can be countered in two ways. One way is to in-
troduce procedures that attempt to level the playing field and provide
equal power to the parties. This fight-fire-with-fire strategy is exem-
plified by numerous reforms from more liberal discovery rules
designed to minimize trial by surprise to the Supreme Court's opinion
in Gideon v. Wainwright,228 requiring court-appointed counsel for in-
digent criminal defendants. 229 Sometimes, as in the case of Gideon,
these efforts achieve their intended beneficial results, other times they
lead to their own adversarial abuses, as is the case when liberal discov-
ery rules are used to harass the opposing party and run up the cost of
litigation. These reforms are premised on an acceptance of the adver-
sarial system. Parties remain in control.
The other way to respond to adversarial excess is to take power
from the parties. Such responses are premised on a rejection of adver-
sarial processes, even when they are presumed to be working prop-
erly. Most of the evidentiary and procedural devices discussed in this
paper are in this category. More active judges and more active juries
inevitably lead to less power in the hands of the parties and their at-
torneys. These responses represent a weakening of adversarialism that
is more fundamental.
Second, there is the question of whether the legal response to com-
plex scientific cases will spread to other cases tried to a jury. Obvi-
ously, some of the response, such as the appointment of 706 experts,
will remain rare as will cases where expert opinion is excluded on
Daubert grounds. On the other hand, it is worth noting that one rea-
son the legal system has responded as it has to these cases is because
226. See TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
227. Brewer, supra note 96.
228. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
229. Id.
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they arose in an environment in which both adversarialism 230 and ju-
ries231 are under a more general attack and in which lawyers are held
in particularly low repute. The scientific complexity of these trials
may have been a necessary cause for many of the responses, but it was
hardly sufficient. From this perspective, complexity was as much a
catalyst as a cause. Whether this catalyst hastens the legal system to a
continued erosion of adversarial processes in all jury trials remains to
be seen.
230. See Carol Greenhouse, Interpreting American Litigiousness, in HISTORY AND POWER IN
THE STUDY OF LAW (Jane Collier & June Starr eds., 1989); Robert Kagan, Do Lawyers Cause
Adversarial Legalism?: A Preliminary Inquiry, 19 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 1 (1994).
231. See Valerie P. Hans, Attitudes Toward the Civil Jury: A Crisis of Confidence?, in VER-
oicr: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra note 56, at 248; Maura Dolan, Judging the Jury
System: Jury System Is Held in Low Regard by Most, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1994, at Al (noting
that 55% of Los Angeles County residents have "only some or very little" confidence in the jury
system).
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